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Abstract
In the course of the lengthy era of military rule in Nigeria, the Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (Shell) enjoyed robust protection from 
the State, a scenario that largely left the unrelenting demands of the Niger Delta 
peoples unheeded. Over the last decade, however, Shell has gradually become 
responsive to the inevitable need of getting involved in State and non-State 
initiatives for finding sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region. At formal 
and informal levels, these initiatives are becoming evident although challenges 
remain. This essay proceeds from the premise that the Niger Delta conflict is 
not interminable. Extrapolating from the various efforts made by Shell towards 
resolving its conflicts with the peoples of the Niger Delta, this essay accentuates 
some of the missing links between top-down efforts and bottom-up initiatives 
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in building sustainable peace in the region. Drawing from learned experiences 
of Shell’s successes and failures as well as of Nigeria’s power relations and 
institutional architecture, this essay contends that while compensatory gestures 
could play a major role in the resolution of conflicts, that approach alone 
cannot guarantee conflict resolution and reconciliation in the Niger Delta. The 
overarching outcome of this evaluation is an attempt at identifying the entry 
points of concerted conflict resolution strategies, with practical focus on the 
short-, medium- and long-term attainment of peace.
Introduction
Although conflicts and conflict resolution techniques have intrigued scholars 
since the ancient times of Thucydides, circa 460–395 BC (Klare 2001; Halsall 
2010; Kemos 2010), scholarly interest in the environmental factors responsible 
for many volatile conflicts, particularly in Africa, is a relatively incipient 
endeavour (Dawson 2006:97; Butera and Leroy 2008).
In general, conflict describes a state of disagreement, disparity or incongruity 
between two or more individuals or groups engaged in the allocation or 
deployment of scarce goods or other resources. Logically, therefore, conflict is 
all about gaining a relative advantage or control in the struggle over who gets 
what, when, and how (Franke 2007:11). Many notable writers have posited that 
conflict is an intrinsic component of social relations and, as an expression of 
the multiplicity of interests, values, and beliefs, it could become the unavoidable 
determinant of development, underdevelopment, social change or social 
stagnation (Coser 1956:8; Omoluabi 2001:2; Olowu 2001:122–123). In some 
instances, non-violent disagreements spiral – and differing individuals or 
social groups resort to material violence in pursuit of their goals. Of course, 
the distribution of natural resources and the redistribution of revenues from 
their extraction are, as my discussion would indicate, also characterised by high 
conflict potential. 
For upwards of the last two decades, hardly has any other topic pertaining 
to Nigeria generated more interest among international commentators and 
observers than the crisis in the Niger Delta region of the country. The recent 
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out-of-court settlement agreed to by the Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC) with the families of the nine Ogoni activists executed in 1995 to the tune 
of US$15.5m (GB£9.6m) has further heightened interest in the intentions of the 
transnational conglomerate and the future of peace in that region. This resort to 
a pecuniary approach within the overall framework of Shell’s engagement with 
conflict resolution underpins the thrust of this essay.
Bearing in mind the overwhelming wealth of scholarly and popular literature 
that has been generated in relation to the Niger Delta crisis, it will serve no 
useful purpose to revisit the existing volumes of works. The focus of this essay is 
therefore rather on the significance of the transition from Shell’s defiant attitude 
towards the profound crises in the Niger Delta to its novel active engagement 
with the dynamic challenges of reconciliation.
While the current rapprochement of Shell with the Ogoni people of the Niger 
Delta may offer an opportunity for the troubled communities to bury the hatchet 
and begin the work of healing old wounds, there is no mistaking the reality that 
more needs to be done to demilitarise the region and to restore tranquillity and 
development.
Shell in the Niger Delta: A panoramic survey
Although empirical works indicate that the efforts at oil prospecting in 
Nigeria commenced before the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates of Nigeria, it was not until 1937, when the Royal 
Dutch conglomerate, Shell D’Arcy, got involved in the quest for crude oil, that 
exploration activities took shape in Nigeria, exclusively in the Niger Delta region 
(Abe and Ayodele 1986:84). 
Since Shell first discovered crude oil at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta region in June 
1956, it has held the largest oil exploration rights from the Nigerian government 
to date. In celebration of the golden jubilee of its oil export business from 




In 2008, Shell and Nigeria celebrated 50 years of oil exports from the 
country. The first commercial export – in 1958 – was from Shell’s Oloibiri 
field. Shell is Nigeria’s oldest energy company, and has a long term and 
continuing commitment to the country, its people and the economy. Today 
Shell companies in Nigeria produce oil and gas from land and swamps in 
the Niger Delta and from deep-water reserves some 120 kilometres off the 
coast. They also operate Nigeria’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, 
which exports all over the world. SPDC is the largest private-sector oil and 
gas company in Nigeria. It is the operator of a joint venture between the 
government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation – NNPC 
(55%), Shell (30%), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited – a subsidiary of Total 
(10%), and Agip (5%). SPDC’s operations in the Niger Delta are spread 
over 30,000 square kilometres. They include a network of more than 6,000 
kilometres of flowlines and pipelines, 90 oil fields, 1,000 producing wells, 
72 flowstations, 10 gas plants and two major oil export terminals at Bonny 
and Forcados. Although the company’s operations are spread throughout 
the region, its footprint impacts directly in only a tiny fraction of the Niger 
Delta. The company is capable of producing an average of 1 million barrels 
of oil equivalent per day (boe/d). In 2008 production from Shell-run 
operations averaged over 850,000 boe/d.
While Shell is not the only transnational oil conglomerate operating in Nigeria, 
it is the longest and largest holder of state oil exploration concessions in the 
country. Despite the volatile changes in Nigerian regimes, nothing has changed 
the equation between the Nigerian State and Shell, the giant oil company. Little 
wonder that Shell has become the face of all other oil companies in Nigeria 
and has often had to bear allegations for wrongdoing occasioned by all the oil 
companies (Bisina 2001:99; Okonta and Douglas 2001:1401–1446; Olukoya 
2001). 
Apart from Shell, other transnational oil companies in the Niger Delta, including 
ChevronTexaco, Elf, Total, ExxonMobil, Agip, and Amoco, among others, were 
attracted to the region by the exceptionally premium Nigerian crude oil, because 
it needs less refining than oil from other fields. According to one account, there 
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are eighteen transnational oil companies operating in Nigeria and accounting 
for about 99 percent of crude oil production in Nigeria (Evuleocha 2005). 
These companies have collectively transformed the entire Niger Delta region 
into the goose that lays the golden eggs of the modern State of Nigeria (Okonta 
and Douglas 2001:77–79). However, while so much wealth is derived from the 
bowel of the region, the scourge of poverty in the region is grim with people 
lacking basic needs for human survival, and the environment is wilfully and 
constantly degraded by oil companies. This was, and remains, the foundation 
of the intractable struggle over resources in the Niger Delta till date (Osaghae 
2003; Aaron 2005). Cyril Obi (2006:13–14) captures the lopsidedness of wealth 
and woes in the region as follows:
Since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the struggle for resource 
control in the Niger Delta has been largely defined by the political economy 
of oil. This is because oil or petroleum has since the 1970s accounted for 
over 80 per cent of the revenues of the federal government, and 95 per cent 
of Nigeria’s external earnings. Oil is therefore the fiscal basis of the Nigerian 
State. It is also paradoxically both a factor of unity among the competing 
factions of the Nigerian power elite, and a source of intense division and 
competition as a result of the extreme passions linked to the struggles over 
oil, and the inequities in the distribution of the oil surplus. In relation to 
the latter point, since over 70 per cent of the oil produced in Nigeria comes 
from the Niger Delta, the ethnic minorities of the region – alienated from 
the oil proceeds, feel ripped off by a homogenizing (but distant) nation-
state project that feeds fat on their oil wealth, leaving them impoverished 
and their environment severely degraded. Therefore, their protests is [sic] 
against the injustice of belonging to a nation-state, Nigeria, which denies 
them their rights as citizens – the right to control and fully enjoy the oil 
wealth produced from under their lands and waters. It is this that explicates 
how the hegemonic nation-state project has literally come under fire in 
the Niger Delta. The quest of the oil minorities to control ‘their’ oil is thus 
underlined by the demand for the restructuring or decentralization of the 
presently over-centralized Nigerian federation.
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It must be mentioned that the Niger Delta of Nigeria is one of the world’s 
largest wetlands, covering an area of approximately 70 000 square kilometres. It 
comprises a number of characteristic ecological zones ranging from the sandy 
coastal ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangroves, fresh water permanent 
and seasonal swamp forest, to lowland rain forest. This area is also completely 
enmeshed among a number of tributaries to the main River Niger, forming along 
its course, streams, rivulets and canals. The tides of the Atlantic Ocean and the 
flood waters of the River Niger are the most influential variables in determining 
the hydrology of the Niger Delta. According to Shell’s official position, the area 
is highly sensitive to changes in water quality (e.g. salinity and pollution) and 
quantity (e.g. flooding) (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Limited [SPDC] 1999:5). 
The population of the Niger Delta is estimated to be between seven and twelve 
million people, most of whom are heterogeneous. They are the Izons (Ijaws), 
Isokos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Ilajes, Ogonis, Andonis, Ibibios, Orons, Efiks, Anangs, 
Bekwaras, Ejaghams, Ekpeyes, Ikwerres, and many other splinter groups, 
spawning the eight littoral states of Nigeria (Bisina 2001; Nwajiaku 2005; 
Long 2007). These people depend for the most part on fishing and small-scale 
subsistence farming for their livelihood. 
The Niger Delta is also very richly endowed with oil and gas deposits. However, 
unsustainable industrial activities such as chemical, manufacturing, and the oil 
and gas industries, especially the last, have combined to exacerbate the stress 
on the already fragile natural environment. A first time visitor to the Niger 
Delta region will need no further evidence of the roots of the conflict in the 
region as vast tell-tale signs abound: severe damage to the flora and fauna of 
the area; marked underdevelopment; abject poverty; naked squalor; lack and 
neglect of basic infrastructural facilities like potable water, passable roads, and 
equipped hospitals. An otherwise arable land, vast farmlands have been turned 
into unproductive resources. The same level of wanton damage to land has been 
done to marine life, leading to dwindling resources for peoples whose livelihood 
depend on fishing. This situation is further compounded by the unwillingness 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria and its foreign joint venture partners to 
81
An evaluation of Shell’s approach to conflict resolution in the Niger Delta
sincerely integrate environmental concerns into national development projects 
(Aka 2003:230–235).
As would be expected, the perennial failure of successive regimes in Nigeria, 
whether civilian or military, to translate the enormous taxes and royalties 
accruing from the resources lifted from the Niger Delta region into wealth 
generation and empowerment for the local populations soon manifested in 
growing resentment, restiveness, and sometimes often violent agitation among 
the various peoples of the Niger Delta (Aka 2003; Ecumenical Council for 
Corporate Responsibility [ECCR] 2010). It soon became obvious that Shell, 
the alter ego of transnational oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta 
had formed a symbiotic relationship with the Nigerian State (Donpedro and 
Naagbaton 1999; Frynas 2001; Olukoya 2001; Ibeanu 2002). This relationship 
had almost become sacrosanct. 
It was in this sort of scenario that multifarious civil groups sprang up all over 
the Niger Delta region in the 1990s, vigorously demanding, inter alia, an end 
to the menace of dehumanisation, despoilment, destitution, devastation, and 
dispossession in the region (Ikelegbe 2001:440; Worika 2001:5).
Analysis of conflict and responses in the Niger Delta
From its otherwise docile position, Shell became increasingly disposed towards 
active response to the agitations of civil society groups in the Niger Delta, often 
with the overt connivance of the Nigerian State. Although in the period between 
1970 and 1989, the local communities of the Niger Delta had merely articulated 
their grievances through incongruent and ad hoc protests often resulting in the 
blockade of access routes to oil installations, the 1990s witnessed more concerted 
unrests in the Niger Delta in unprecedented fashion. According to Ikelegbe 
(2001:438), civil society and youth groups had emerged ‘as a mobilization 
platform of popular struggle.’ 
With the anti-Shell protests becoming more sporadic, pronounced and 
coordinated across the Niger Delta, the stage had been prepared for the 
collaborative agenda of the giant oil company and the Nigeria State to be fully 
uncovered. In an environment in which any and all protests against Shell’s 
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injurious oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta were confronted with 
massive state armed response channelled towards the singular objective of 
repressing all dissent, the deaths, rapes, arrests, detentions and other wanton 
recklessness by agents of the state became the natural consequences of the 
patrimonial alliance between the State and Shell. By 1995, it was no longer in 
doubt that Shell had shelved its toga of passivity for one of active reliance on 
the use of brutal intimidation and repression by state forces to quell opposition 
to its business interests in the Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch 1999a:154–
156; Ibeanu 2000:21; Obi 2001:179; Groves 2008:11–15). The relentless spate 
of violence and repression unleashed on the hapless peoples of the Niger Delta 
in the 1990s has been documented in numerous works and it serves no useful 
purpose revisiting the litany of records (Greenpeace International 1994; Human 
Rights Watch 1999b; Essential Action and Global Exchange 2000; Aaron 2005; 
Ikelegbe 2005).
In cause-and-effect fashion, the Nigerian state-sponsored agenda of brutal 
repression of opposition to the activities of transnational oil conglomerates 
only strengthened the growth of agitations and protests among Niger Delta 
communities. In quick succession, several organised and well-coordinated 
civil society groups with varying degrees of demands and approaches to the 
struggle against Shell and other conglomerates had emerged in the Niger Delta. 
Prominent among these were the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni Peoples 
(MOSOP), led by the indefatigable Kenule Saro Wiwa; the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ijaw (Izon) Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND); 
the Movement for the Reparation of Ogbia (Oloibiri) (MORETO); Chikoko 
Movement; the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); the Urhobo Foundation, and many 
more. These various organisations had adopted well-articulated demands often 
laced with a tinge of threats, against the oil companies and the patrimonial 
state. While MOSOP adopted the ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights’ in 1990, MORETO 
came up with the ‘Charter of Demands of the Ogbia People’ in 1992, MOSIEND 
launched the ‘Izon People’s Charter’ in 1997, and the IYC launched its ‘Kaiama 
Declaration’ in 1998. The Ikwerre and Oron peoples also proclaimed their 
‘Ikwerre Rescue Charter’ and ‘Oron Bill of Rights’, respectively, in 1999, just 
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as the Urhobo Foundation published its ‘Urhobo Bill of Rights’ in 2002 (Pegg 
2000:706; Bisina 2001:95–96; Osaghae 2003:96–98).  
The new Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) later emerged as groups generally 
impatient with the non-violent approaches of the groups listed above. These two 
later groups adopted guerrilla tactics of negotiation, including kidnapping of 
employees of the transnational oil companies, bunkering of oil pipelines, seizure 
of oil rigs and installations, interruption of oil production processes, armed 
confrontation with state security forces, and general militarised operations 
(Bentley et al. 2010; ECCR 2010). 
It was against this backdrop that the Nigerian State arrested environmental 
rights activist and MOSOP leader, Kenule Saro Wiwa, on charges of conspiracy 
and murder of four Ogoni chiefs. Despite the massive protestations of local and 
international media in opposition to the sham criminal proceedings against 
Saro Wiwa and eight others as well as pleas from eminent institutions and 
personalities, the Nigerian military junta did not hesitate to execute the nine 
activists in the most gruesome manner, in November 1995. The consequences 
of these stage-managed killings were grave for the corporate image of Shell and 
will remain long-lasting.
With the introduction of democratic experimentation in 1999, the popular 
expectations had been that tranquillity would return to the Niger Delta 
region after the long and repressive years of military regime. The Obasanjo 
administration had swiftly set up the Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission, popularly called the ‘Oputa Panel’, to investigate human rights 
violations committed in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, between 1966 and 28 
May 1999. The Niger Delta communities had made very extensive presentations 
to the Commission. The seven-person Commission was headed by a respected 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Chukwudifu Oputa, and sat for 
three years, three weeks and six days. Despite the Commission’s work being so 
meticulous and intense, the Nigerian federal government never released the 
report and findings of the Commission, till date. Whatever is available from 
the Commission’s report has been through the effort of underground activists 
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and researchers. In this regard, the efforts of the US-based Nigerian Democratic 
Movement and the Nigeria-based Civil Society Forum to publish the full report 
of the Oputa Panel must be commended. It is noteworthy that since January 
2005 when these non-governmental organisations published the report, there 
has been no official denial of its accuracy or authenticity. 
Apart from being highly critical of all Nigeria’s military governments and 
holding them accountable for numerous acts of gross violations of human 
rights, including those that occurred in the Niger Delta, it is significant, for 
our purposes, to note that with regard to the Niger Delta, the Oputa Panel 
recommended, inter alia, that the federal government closely monitors the social, 
political and environmental conditions in the region ‘with the local communities 
playing a central role in the execution and evaluation’ of development projects 
(National Democratic Movement 2005:65). As corollary to this, the Oputa Panel 
also recommended broad consultations with the civil society about Nigeria’s 
constitutional structure, improved human rights education, a moratorium on 
the creation of further states and local governments to curb corruption, and the 
fragmentation of the political system (National Democratic Movement 2005: 
64–65; United States Institute of Peace 2010).
The Obasanjo administration subsequently introduced the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) Bill into the National Assembly which was 
eventually passed into law despite some political imbroglio in 2000. The NDDC 
Act debuted with a mission to right the wrongs of the past and to facilitate the 
swift, equal and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that 
is prosperous, stable, regenerative and peaceful. Specifically, section 7 of the 
NDDC Act of 2000 conferred the following functions and powers on the NDDC:
7.(1) The Commission shall – 
a. formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger 
Delta area, 
b. conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and 
regulations, projects and programmes for the sustainable development 
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of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, 
jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industrialisation, 
agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water 
supply, electricity and telecommunications; 
c. cause the Niger Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures 
which are necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic 
development, 
d. prepare master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical 
development of the Niger Delta area and the estimates of the costs of 
implementing such master plans and schemes;
e. implement all the measures approved for the development of the Niger 
Delta area by the Federal Government and the member States of the 
Commission; 
f. identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta area and 
assist the member States in the formulation and implementation of 
policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of 
the Niger Delta area, 
g. assess and report on any project being funded or carried out in the 
Niger Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and any other 
company including non-governmental organisations and ensure that 
funds released for such projects are properly utilised; 
h. tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the 
exploration of oil mineral in the Niger Delta area and advise the 
Federal Government and the member States on the prevention and 
control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution, 
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i. liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing 
companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control, 
j. execute such other works and perform such other functions which 
in the opinion of the Commission are required for the sustainable 
development of the Niger Delta area and its peoples.
Despite the wide-ranging powers conferred on the NDDC, however, the 
‘Nigerian factor’ was soon to catch up with this body as it became embroiled in 
personality clashes; political imbroglio; corruption among its top echelons; and 
nepotism, among other vices (Quaker-Dokubo 2000b:20–23; Omotola 2007:73; 
Aghalino 2009:57). The expectations that greeted the Obasanjo administration 
and its NDDC Act intervention were soon dashed. 
It should be remembered that prior to the enactment of the NDDC Act, the 
Nigerian Army had descended on the sleepy  town of Odi, in Bayelsa State, in 
November 1999, killing scores of civilians and destroying vast amounts of landed 
and personal assets in retaliation for the murder of 12 policemen by a local gang 
(Ikelegbe 2001:461–462). Despite on-and-off attempts at establishing peace 
agreements and truce thereafter, sporadic killings and kidnappings of foreign 
oil workers as well as government’s reprisal attacks continued throughout the 
Obasanjo administration. A viable ‘political solution’ to the Niger Delta crisis 
has become elusive ever after. 
So palpable was the failure of the Obasanjo administration that the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2006:9) described the region as 
‘suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and 
services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and 
squalor, and endemic conflict’.
The slow-paced Yar’Adua administration that succeeded Obasanjo in 2007 
has not evolved any cogent policy or framework that marks a shift from its 
predecessor. In a move that was calculated to be the master stroke of solutions, 
President Umar Yar’Adua in 2009 announced a blanket amnesty for all Niger 
Delta militants who were up in arms against the Nigerian federation, and 
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of course, its collaborator oil companies. The amnesty offer came with the 
announcement of cash and food rewards.1 While the amnesty offer was hailed 
by some as an indication of genuine government commitment to finding 
a solution to the crisis ravaging the Niger Delta, the unanswered question is 
whether amnesty alone can avail a cure for all the ills ravaging the area. It is 
particularly worrisome that the Nigerian government has refused to apply the 
international standards of decommissioning as have been witnessed in peace 
processes in other climes (Okolo 2009).
All in all, it has become apparent that from an onset of hard core hostility and 
repression, the Nigerian State has transformed into engaging the Niger Delta 
issue with some level of responsiveness even if such an attitude is marred by 
insincerity, warped planning and skewed policy action. Notwithstanding, it is 
safe to posit that the change of attitude by the patrimonial State went some way 
in re-shaping the attitude of Shell as well in the course of time.
Shell’s rapprochement towards conflict resolution: A 
critique of strategies
While the degree of Shell’s culpability in the execution of Kenule Saro Wiwa and 
eight others in 1995 need not becloud our discussion, it is worthy to mention 
that Shell embarked on an internal review of its projects and policies in the Niger 
Delta region after 1999. Since that time, Shell has conducted annual reviews of 
its community development projects and has, since 2002, been publishing its 
remittances to the Federal Government of Nigeria to promote transparency 
and accountability. Shell has openly committed itself to the elimination of 
gas flaring and to the effective mopping up of oil spillages. Furthermore, as a 
supporter of the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, Shell is contributing to 
UN discussions on business and human rights and permits external review of its 
annual Sustainability Reports (Chen 2007:21–23; Shell 2008:20–21).
1 Mail and Guardian Online. Amnesty deal in Niger-Delta. 16 August 2009. Available from: 




In a marked departure from Shell’s attitude in the Nigerian military years, the 
company has committed itself to the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights. In its 2008 Sustainability Report, for instance, Shell (2008:8) 
averred that its 
Business Principles include support for fundamental human rights. We 
review the human rights risks faced by our projects and operations in 
high-risk countries. Where we identify risks, we systematically develop 
action plans so that we avoid violating the rights highlighted. Our Shell-
wide security standards define how we protect our people and assets, 
while respecting the rights of others, including local communities. These 
standards set strict guidelines on the use of force and armed security, and 
incorporate the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which 
are a guide for companies in extractive industries and the energy sector.
Without doubt, Shell’s current disposition towards engagement with the Niger 
Delta communities through the provision of healthcare facilities and services; 
the construction of schools and training facilities for youths and farmers; and 
the promotion of small-scale businesses in the Niger Delta area is commendable 
and yielding positive results even if paltry (Groves 2008; Chen 2007; Shell 2009). 
One of the vexatious issues in the Niger Delta conflict involves the remediation 
of environmental damage occasioned by oil exploration activities in the 
region. In response to the gale of accusations against Shell, the company has 
repeatedly expressed its commitment to reducing the environmental and social 
impacts from producing oil and gas as part of its contribution to sustainable 
development. Currently on its website, Shell says:
We have researched and adopted a technique for cleaning up oil spills that 
we believe to be the most effective for the soil and climate conditions in 
the equatorial heat of the Niger Delta. We add nutrients that stimulate the 
natural microbes in the soil. These feed on the oil and break it down. In 
2008, we continued our programme to clean up and remediate oil spills that 
happened before 2005 – completing seven more sites. By year-end we had 
completed 68 of the 74 outstanding pre-2005 spill sites...Wherever possible, 
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local communities take part in the remedial work on paid contracts and 
in a number of successful projects, local youths have been employed in 
the cleanup process. On the whole, our investigations show that complex 
soil and water pollution problems are not present, but in some cases, 
we have found difficulty in assessing the condition of sites, because the 
local community prevents access. It is in nobody’s interest to leave these 
sites as they are. We have intensified our efforts at negotiation with local 
communities so that we can gain access, clean up and remediate the land. 
We are also looking at involving local communities in monitoring facilities 
(Shell 2010b).2
While Shell thus frantically pursues aggressive image-laundering through print 
and electronic media, vigorous campaigns backed by empirical and statistical 
data by civil society groups and the affected communities continue to showcase 
Shell’s claims as grossly inadequate, misdirected, narrow, and self-serving. The 
new-fangled Community Development Programme designed by Shell for the 
Niger Delta area has recently been condemned as demonstrating ‘the usual 
lack of community consultation, top-down approach, failed projects, sporadic 
crises and questionably close ties to locations of company operations. Most 
projects appear to be less a response to priorities of communities than guided 
by the company’s logic of providing access to locations and comfort for its staff ’ 
(Pyagbara 2010:25).
It is apparent that all of Shell’s efforts still lack the basic linkage with the 
ordinary peoples of the Niger Delta. As Ereba and Dumpe (2010:32–35) 
recently established following field studies in several parts of the Niger Delta, 
there is a gross deficiency of transparent and credible public participation in 
the environmental impact assessment processes which inform Shell’s activities 
in the region. 
Even as Shell fervently continues to broadcast its commitment to human rights 
and sustainable development towards stability in the Niger Delta by publishing 
2 Assertions similar to the above are commonplace on Shell’s websites. See, for example, 
Shell 2010c; Sunmonu 2010.
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reports detailing its operational standards and policies, corporate citizenship 
ideal, and its embrace of independent assessors and civil society groups, it is so 
that transforming management systems and developing competencies conducive 
to peace and solutions in the Niger Delta require considerable training, new 
types of recruit ment, penalty and incentive systems similar to those recently 
recommended by the Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR 
2010:5–8). The difficulties encountered by Shell in translating its corporate 
discourse and commitment to resolve the issues of conflict and social and 
environmental justice involving the Niger Delta peoples into an effective strategy 
at the local level can, to some extent, be explained by the following factors:
• indications that its surveillance contracts are heavily focused on its own 
corporate security as opposed to human security in the region; 
• acceptance of corruption regarding oil spills and environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs); 
• its failure to stop gas flaring despite all posturing and grandstanding; and 
• the systemic problems of its continued use of old and rusty oil pipelines as 
well as heavy maximisation of oil production such that occasion intolerable 
risks to human beings and the environment (Ite 2004; Omeje 2006; Groves 
2008; Omonisini et al. 2010; Stakeholder Democracy Network 2010).
Although Shell endeavours to deflect criticisms against its staggering tax 
and royalty payoffs to the Federal Government of Nigeria in contrast to the 
millions of Niger Delta peoples living in abject poverty and naked squalor, 
even as recently as in its rejoinder to the ECCR Report in February 2010 
(ECCR 2010:8),3 there is a pressing need to craft a statutory method of vesting 
the exploration and appropriation of the resources in the Niger Delta in the 
communities comprising the Niger Delta themselves rather than the culture of 
patronage now entrenched through Shell’s arbitrary donations, settlements, and 
funding to self-appointed elites, clandestine representatives, and bogus youth 
3 The ECCR reports that ‘ECCR provided Shell with this report in draft form and invited it 
to comment. In response, SPDC stated its view that the report is not a sufficiently complete 
or balanced assessment – because ‘the primary and overriding authority and responsibility’ 
for what takes place in the Niger-Delta ‘rests with the state.’ (ECCR 2010: 8). 
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and community ‘leaders’. This is at the heart of local demands and there can 
be no wishing such an arrangement away. For now, representative powers are 
being siphoned away from the ordinary people. These powers could be used to 
constitute institutionalised forms of popular participation that the participatory 
development movement is striving for. Without the mediation of representative 
authority, what prevails is a plurality of institutions that has become a formula 
for elite capture.
Finally, on this segment, the compensatory strategy adopted by Shell in making 
extra-judicial, self-help monetary awards to respective Niger Delta communities 
has opened the company to a further spate of criticisms. Although section 77 
of the Nigerian Petroleum Act mandates an exploiter of oil resources to pay an 
owner of land ‘such sums as may be a fair and reasonable compensation for any 
disturbance of the surface rights of such owner or occupier and for any damage 
done to the surface of the land upon which his prospecting or mining is being or 
has been carried on and shall in addition pay to the owner of any crops, economic 
trees, buildings or works damaged, removed or destroyed by him or by any 
agent or servant of his compensation for such damage, removal or destruction’, 
the statute is silent about the yardsticks of assessing the damage vis-à-vis the 
amount to be paid. This gap has left the assessment of compensatory awards to 
the whims of Shell (Akpan 2010; Pyagbara 2010:24). Amnesty International has 
also criticised Shell’s approach to compensation as ‘neither transparent nor fair, 
leaving people to obtain what they can by negotiation’ (Amnesty International 
2009:71). 
Similarly, while Shell labelled the US$15.5m (GB£9.7m) it agreed to pay to the 
families of Kenule Saro Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni activists to stop the 
case instituted against Royal Dutch Shell as ‘humanitarian gesture’ (Shell 2009; 
Wuerth 2009), the gesture smacks of corporate hypocrisy and culpability in 
Nigeria’s legendary culture of institutionalised corruption and appeasement. 
What more? Since the advancement of the extra-judicial largesse, Shell has not 
known stability beyond what predated the ‘humanitarian gesture’. The payment 
has not ended the violent struggle between other Nigerian communities and oil 
companies, and the campaign of attacks on oil installations and kidnappings 
of oil workers continues unabatedly. There is no gainsaying the fact that the 
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strategy is diversionary and discriminatory and simply promotes the post-
modern Nigerian ethos of aggrandisement and profligacy.
Building peace and stability in the Niger Delta: Facing the 
future
That divergent interests are at the centre of conflicts is a proposition with sound 
acceptance (Burton 1998). If conflicts are indeed all about divergent interests, it 
only follows that any sincere attempt at resolving them must consciously balance 
competing interests and not assume they will be resolved through patrimonial 
approaches as the compensatory system adopted by Shell, as the leading face of 
the transnational oil corporations in Nigeria, would suggest. The pathway to 
conflict resolution, reconciliation and stability in the Niger Delta is manifold 
and only some dimensions often overlooked are underscored at this juncture.
One critical step towards sustainable conflict resolution and stability in the Niger 
Delta region is to squarely place the fiscal federalism question into the discourses. 
All the charters of aspirations and demands drawn up by all the Niger Delta 
nationalities make this a primary item of purpose. Shell must therefore insist that 
the Nigerian federal government tackle this question headlong. Despite all the 
rhetoric contained in the various statutes on the issue of natural resources, the 
federal government has not really wanted to devolve any real power to the lower 
tiers of government. To secure this end, the aspirations of the various ethnic 
nationalities as contained in their Bills of Rights, Declarations and Charters of 
Demand must become central tools in collaborative peace-building ventures to 
be spearheaded by the Nigerian government, and incorporating transnational 
oil companies operating in Nigeria as well as every oil-producing community 
in the Niger Delta.
Furthermore, in forging credible pathways to peace and stability in the Niger 
Delta, a need arises for radical legislative interventions that would expunge 
all provisions in the Land Use Act of 1978, and all statutes relating to oil and 
mineral resources which vest absolute control of lands and resources in lands 
in the Federal Government of Nigeria. It is for this reason regrettable that the 
more recent Minerals and Mining Act of 2007 also retained the provision that 
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has perennially infuriated Niger Delta communities, and once again represented 
a missed opportunity at conflict resolution.
In the same vein, Community Development Agreements (CDAs) should be 
incorporated into the Petroleum Industry Bill currently before the Nigerian 
National Assembly, to ensure development of the oil-producing communities. 
These CDAs should be prerequisites for the issuance of licenses to transnational 
oil companies as contained in section 116 of the Mineral and Mining Act of 
2007. 
On the part of Shell, as the alter ego of all transnational oil companies in Nigeria, 
this conglomerate must assume leadership by revisiting its General Business 
Principles of 1976 and establishing renewed and verifiable compliance with 
these voluntary goals. Beyond lip-service and posturing, Shell must begin to 
actively integrate economic, environmental and social considerations into its 
decision-making processes in a transparent and sincere way.
Any effort at resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta cannot shy away from the 
question of ethnic and national identities – as the twin questions of ethnicity and 
identity form the very essence of agitations (Aka 2003; Quaker-Dokubo 2000a; 
Osaghae 2003; Worika 2001). With the vast heterogeneity of the communities in 
the Niger Delta, multiple and conflicting identities present competing incentives 
to resist the approach adopted by Shell towards the Ogonis. What more? 
Assuaging the grievances of the Ogonis would appear to have assumed some air 
of primacy even prior to Shell’s recent ‘humanitarian gesture’. In the complaint 
brought before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) against the government of Nigeria by Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre (SERAC), a Nigerian non-governmental organisation (NGO),  and 
the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), a US-based NGO, in March 
1996, the complainants had alleged, inter alia, that the Nigerian government 
together with its oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), acting in concert with the transnational oil conglomerate, Shell, had 
through protracted oil exploration activities degraded the environment and 
caused huge health problems for the Ogoni people without care or concern 
for the affected people in violation of several provisions of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) (SERAC and CESR 1996). It 
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was however queer how the entire African Commission was led into confusing 
the Niger Delta with ‘Ogoniland’. The African Commission apparently failed to 
note that in all the correspondence from the Nigerian government during the 
proceedings, the government consistently referred to ‘the Niger Delta’ (Olowu 
2005:41). Just as the African Commission was culpable in abdicating the 
necessity of defining or analysing the status of the ‘Ogoni communities’ within 
the Nigerian federal context to determine their qualification as ‘peoples’ under 
the African Charter, so were the two NGOs that brought the communication 
equally indictable for subterfuge activism. Beyond merely listing article 21 as 
one of the rights allegedly violated, the communication presenters neither raised 
a head of argument particularising the violation nor canvassed oral arguments 
to establish that the ‘Ogoni communities’ were so distinct and particularly 
affected as to be entitled to the ‘exclusive interest’ emphasised in article 21(1) of 
the African Charter. 
The conflict in the Niger Delta region has become oversimplified into an Ogoni 
conflict. Nothing can be further from the realities than this. International 
scholarship has also persistently and unfortunately laboured under this 
unmistakable misconception and misrepresentation.4 
In his analysis of oil politics in Nigeria, Watts emphasised the role of both 
States and transnational oil companies in reinforcing social identities. To Watts 
(2005:54),
the presence and activities of the oil companies…constitute a challenge to 
customary forms of community authority, inter-ethnic relations, and local 
state institutions principally through the property and land disputes that 
are engendered, via forms of popular mobilization and agitation. These 
political struggles are animated by the desire to gain access to (i) company 
rents and compensation revenues, and (ii) federal petrorevenues by 
capturing rents, (often fraudulently) through the creation of new regional 
and/or local state institutions.
4 As a pointer, virtually all scholarly literature on SERAC’s Case use ‘Ogoni’ in the shortened 
title of the case. Indeed, the petition exclusively alleged violations of the rights of the 
‘Ogoni communities’ and not that of the millions of other peoples in the Niger Delta area. 
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For purposes of records and further empirical studies, the ‘Ogonis’ constitute a 
mere fraction of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which traverses some eight 
coastal states of the Nigerian federation. Without mincing words, therefore, 
Shell’s outreach to the Ogonis via the out-of-court settlement in the Saro Wiwa 
et al. court case represents a drop in a mighty ocean of conflicts and rather than 
assuage emotive feelings, the ‘humanitarian gesture’ might only have deepened 
the sentiments of animosity, hostility and alienation long felt by the numerous 
competing peoples, clans, nationalities and groups in the Niger Delta who had 
suffered human and pecuniary losses in the past.
To this end, joint negotiation forums consisting of genuine community 
representatives, ordinary peasants, skilled professionals and knowledgeable 
government officials must aggregate equitable, all-inclusive frameworks of 
determining and appropriating community projects, with transparent tender 
mechanisms and risk management systems.
The conflict in the Niger Delta continues to challenge the Nigerian government, 
the transnational oil companies, the ethnic nationalities and the international 
community. While the international community may have deferred to the 
Nigerian government’s assertion that the Niger Delta crisis is an internal affair, 
the global community nonetheless also has a stake in resolving this protracted 
conflict. The international community is therefore not without a responsibility 
in this solution-seeking venture. The industrial States of the West should impose 
an embargo on all military aid to Nigerian armed forces and military equipment 
trade with Nigeria until all human rights violations in the Niger Delta are 
prosecuted and redressed or, at least, until the recommendations of the Oputa 
Panel of 2002, as already highlighted, are revisited and implemented.
Conclusion
Suggestions towards conflict resolution and peace in the Niger Delta have been 
as varied as the number of authors. This essay has explored various dimensions 
to the Niger Delta conflict, raising particular concerns about the compensatory 
approach adopted by Shell to its resolution and reconciliation.
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While the compensatory approach has its definite short-term advantages, this 
essay considered the resolution of the multifaceted and protracted conflicts 
in the Niger Delta as demanding holistic approaches. The essay has identified 
matters that should be paramount in institutionalising legal and policy pathways 
to resolving the Niger Delta conflict as it is one crisis that cannot be resolved 
outside the larger Nigerian question.
Far from being an ex cathedra pronouncement on all the dynamics that should 
inform the attainment of tranquillity and stability in the Niger Delta, this essay 
would have served its purpose if it stimulates further intellectual enquiry.
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